Date Posted: 20-Mar-2025
In this report, Sarbhanu Nath, Saurav Sarkar, and Xavier Casals examine the evolving role of the CCG in its activities related to Taiwan. This piece is part of a warning intelligence project monitoring and assessing the likelihood of China invading Taiwan in the six- to 12-month period after publication. Janes published the previous iteration of the report in December 2024. The report identifies key developments among the indicators tracked, which Janes analysts will address in the form of deep-dive reports over the coming months.
Key points
- Intelligence requirement: This report assesses the evolving role of the CCG in relation to Taiwan and the impact this has on Taiwan's national security. The role of the CCG is being examined in relation to the main intelligence requirement: is China going to invade Taiwan in the next six to 12 months?
- Significance: Since the beginning of 2024 the CCG has been increasing its presence around Taiwanese territory. In 2024 the CCG participated in Chinese military exercises around Taiwan for the first time, likely indicating an enhanced focus on the CCG being used to increase pressure on Taiwan. The participation of the CCG in such exercises also helps in increasing its operational capabilities and will likely enable it to support direct military action against Taiwan in an invasion scenario
- Assessment and outlook: Joint training exercises between China's naval forces and the CCG are almost certain to continue over the next 12–24 months as the forces seek to improve their interoperability capabilities. CCG patrols are also very likely to increase over the next six to 12 months as part of China's strategy to gradually increase pressure on Taiwan and normalise the CCG's presence around Taiwanese territorial waters
Intelligence requirement
Is China going to invade Taiwan in the next six to 12 months?
- What is the role of the China Coast Guard (CCG) in supporting China's Taiwan-related operations?
- What is the command structure of the CCG in relation to Taiwan?
- What is the level of interoperability of the CCG with other branches of China's armed forces?
- What is the role played by the CCG in other disputed areas?
- What has been Taiwan's response to CCG activities?
Significance
Overview
In the December 2024 report, Janes analysts examined the activities of the CCG within the mobilisation of troops indicator, observing an increase in the frequency of CCG participation in People's Liberation Army (PLA) drills, the depth and frequency of CCG patrols in the waters around Taiwanese territories such as Kinmen and Matsu, and an increase in the number and quality of CCG vessels deployed in Taiwan operations. This contributed to the indicator's assessment of a moderate warning.
Indicator assessment. (Janes)
This deep dive will focus on the role, recent activities, and use of the CCG in 2024 as a key actor in increasing pressure on Taiwan, and will provide an assessment on the most likely outlook for the CCG in the next six to 12 months.
Assessment
C2 structure of the CCG, organisation, and platforms deployed in Taiwan operations
In 2013 China's National People's Congress integrated four of the country's existing civilian coastguard and maritime law enforcement organisations under a new body, the CCG Bureau. In 2018 further reforms brought the CCG into the People's Armed Police (PAP), effectively placing it under the command structure of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This made the CCG part of the armed forces, becoming an agency with hybrid responsibilities; according to the Coast Guard Law, which became effective in February 2021, the CCG enforces China's maritime claims and Chinese law in these waters, and is also responsible for investigating maritime crimes.
According to the law, the CCG is organised in four levels – the CCG Bureau, which includes coastal district departments – north, east, and south; the provincial coastguard bureaus within each district; the municipal coastguard bureaus; and the coastguard workstations (Article 2). Although government agencies at all levels have the “right to inform [and] report” the CCG agencies to the procuratorate and the military supervisory organs (Article 70), they hold no command power over the CCG. According to Article 71, CCG agencies at each level are responsible for the supervision of the subordinate coastguard agencies. In peacetime the CCG ultimately responds to the CMC through the PAP, but in times of war – and when involved in war-related operations – the PLA holds command-and-control (C2) over the CCG through the relevant Theater Command, by-passing the PAP.
Organisations of the China Coast Guard. (Janes)
CCG vessels under different C2 structures may operate at the same time in the same region, depending on the activity. For example, in the October 2024 ‘Joint Sword-2024B' exercise, four formations of the CCG encircled Taiwan's main island – very likely under PLA command – while Fujian Coast Guard vessels conducted law enforcement patrols in the Taiwanese islands of Matsu and Wuqiu.
In 2024 Janes analysts identified 45 coastguard platforms involved in Taiwan-related operations, excluding auxiliaries – 23 operating under the provincial and municipal bureaus and 22 operating under the coastal district department. From the analysis of these vessels, Janes assesses with high confidence that newer, heavier, more capable platforms operate under higher levels of the CCG structure, while older, smaller vessels are limited to near-coast operations at the municipal level. None of the 23 platforms identified operating at the provincial and municipal levels reached 2,000 tonnes – with many being lighter than 1,000 tonnes, while 14 of the 22 operating under the coastal district department had a tonnage above that benchmark, including the Zhaotou-class 2901 vessel, with a tonnage above 11,000.
Coastal district-level vessels led the four formations patrolling around Taiwan's main island in ‘Joint Sword-2024B' and operating more closely with PLA assets. Janes assesses with high confidence that sea district vessels are the preferred option to join PLA drills, given their quality, capabilities, tonnage, and capacity to operate farther from the coast.
For more information, please see Insight report: Assessing China Coast Guard's role and capabilities in relation to Taiwan
