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Ukraine conflict: Russia fires ‘experimental' missile for first time

Date Posted: 22-Nov-2024
Author: 
Meredith Roaten, Washington, DC Nicholas Fiorenza, London Nick Brown, London

Key points

  • Russia's use of a supposedly novel missile system appears to have no military effect on the ground, Janes assesses
  • The missile's most likely use was as strategic-level signalling within the conflict

An “experimental” intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a conventional warhead hit Dnipro, Ukraine, on 21 November, Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters in a press conference.

Russian missile strikeFirefighters work at the site of a Russian missile strike in Dnipro on November 21, which included the first firing in combat of a suspected RS-26 Rubezh IRBM. A rehabilitation centre for people with disabilities was damaged by the Russian attack, along with an industrial enterprise and nine garages. Ukrainian officials reported that two people were injured. (State Emergency Service of Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk Region)

Secretive programme

Singh said that the missile was based on Russia's RS-26 Rubezh solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However the missile fired at Dnipro was not itself classified as an ICBM despite Ukrainian officials describing it as such earlier in the day, Singh said during the 21 November briefing. Singh put the difference in assessments down to both strategic missile types having similar flightpaths and high trajectories. This is the first time this IRBM – called Oreshnik (Hazel tree) by Russian forces – has ever been launched on the battlefield, she said.

“This was a new type of lethal capability that was employed on the battlefield, so that's certainly a concern to us,” Singh said. An assessment of the weapon's impact is currently ongoing.

Singh declined to say if the missile had multiple warheads or what type of warheads it carried.

During the aerial assault on the city, the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile and X-101 air-launched missile types were also used, said the Ukrainian Air Force (Povitryani syly Zbroynykh syl Ukrayiny: PS ZSU) in a statement on 21 November.

Russia notified the US shortly before the IRBM was launched through nuclear risk reduction channels, Singh confirmed.

The Oreshnik launch was a “test”, said Russian President Vladimir Putin during remarks on 21 November. He claimed Ukrainian long-range strikes into Russian territory in recent days were the reason for this attack.

While Russia notified the US shortly before the launch, the Pentagon had been briefing the Ukrainian government for days on a possible attack, Singh said. She declined to provide details on the intelligence assessment that led to the briefings.

US Department of Defense (DoD) officials are still assessing the damage from the strikes and broader impact on the war effort, Singh said. “Ukraine has withstood countless attacks from Russia, including missiles with significantly larger warheads than this weapon,” she noted.

Dnipro is the location of the headquarters of Ukrainian missile and space rocket company Pivdenmash, known as Yuzhmash to Moscow.

The Pentagon has continued to decline to confirm reports of North Korean soldiers involved in fighting. More than 11,000 soldiers have entered the Kursk region, Singh told reporters on 19 November.

Long-range attacks into Russia from Ukraine have been reported in recent days, but US and UK officials have still not publicly confirmed that their long-range attack missiles were used in the operations. Two security assistance packages have been drawn down from US stocks in November, but it is unclear if they contained additional MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) munitions that have previously been provided to Kyiv.

To read more on this missile, please see RS-26 ICBM trial expected by year end and Rubezh RS-26.

Analysis by Janes OSINT Forces Monitoring
This is the first employment of such a missile system in such a configuration observed, and the available evidence is still limited.
 
From impact site assessment the ‘blasts' of the weapon were weak and likely incapable of causing major structural damage to reinforced objects. According to the available images the main damage seems to be more apparent on the weaker points of buildings, such as roofs and windows. There is little evidence of damage from ‘fragmentation'. Moderate ‘thermal' damage was caused by fire. It is not clear if this fire was caused by the ignition of the rocket propellant or by a warhead (given the weakness of the blast).
 
In terms of weapon employment, video footage shared on social media showed the arrival through the clouds of six groups of ordnance, each comprising between four and six munitions. Janes observed that the strike was sequential, with an approximate one second spacing between each group (six groups in nine seconds). Every ordnance within a group impacted simultaneously on the same area target in a linear pattern. Therefore, if it was a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), it did not demonstrate the ability to manoeuvre and engage multiple targets independently.
 
Areas struck included (some reportedly and some confirmed) an industrial enterprise, a rehabilitation centre, residential houses, and garages. Video footage shared on social media showed a building damaged at geographic co-ordinates 48.450481, 35.033657. A video taken from the northern bank of the Dnipro river showed kinetic effect being delivered at an azimuth that intersects the industrial area of the Chechelivskyi district, but there is no solid evidence of a successful hit or of the damage.
 
From a strictly operational point of view, the overall kinetic engagement did not produce significant military outcomes for the Russians, and the ordnance did not impact Ukrainian high-value military capabilities in the area, neither from an “area target” nor from a “point target” perspective, which would be the usual use of military capabilities.
Comment
As the first use of an IRBM in Europe, this is an interesting incident and will continue to deliver information on the weapon system from radar tracks and wreckage. It appears not to have had battlefield effects that could not have been delivered more efficiently by other weapon systems. The likely purpose of the action was more about strategic-level political signalling in the contest between Moscow, Washington DC, Kyiv, London, and others to define and enforce red lines on the use of different weapons and forces by the Ukrainian and Russian militaries.
 
There is little concrete open-source information available in the immediate aftermath of the strikes, but the missile's flightpath would have been visible to the SPY-1 radars of NATO's Aegis Ashore facilities in Redzikowo, Poland, and Deveselu, Romania, and other early warning sensors. Among the latter are potentially US Navy destroyers USS Bulkeley and USS Arleigh Burke, which are both equipped to undertake ballistic missile defence roles and are understood to be in the Eastern Mediterranean.
 
Janes also noted an increase in NATO aerial electronic surveillance activity over Eastern Europe on 21 November, with a mix of RC-135, E-3, S102B Korpen, P-8, and RQ4 aircraft on station near Russia.
 
Janes has no verifiable performance data on this new missile system, but if it is based on the RS-26 Rubezh, that would place it beyond the air-defence capabilities of systems currently in Ukrainian service. Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) exo-atmospheric interceptors were designed to engage IRBMs, but there are no indications as of 22 November that these would be offered for Ukrainian service.
 
Regardless of the target or battlefield effect of the 21 November missile strikes on Dnipro, the use of what looks for now to be an uncounterable weapon system can be interpreted as a strategic message from Russia.