Date Posted: 06-Nov-2024
Author: Meredith Roaten, Washington, DC Jeremiah Cushman, Washington, DC Zach Rosenberg, Washington, DC Carlo Munoz, Washington, DC Michael Fabey, Washington, DC
Key points
- Donald Trump won another term as US president and his Republican Party won control of the US Senate
- His national security team will be formed over the coming months, and will have to address defence policy issues from military aid to AI development
Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election on 5 November returns the White House to the Republican Party, which will also control the Senate (control of the House of Representatives was not clear at the time of publication).
There are significant unknowns about Trump's likely defence policies, as military issues did not play a large role in either party's election campaign. However, Trump's second administration will encounter a handful of notable upcoming acquisition and policy issues.
Military aid
Since war between Russia and Ukraine reignited in 2022, the United States has promised nearly USD61 billion in total assistance between equipment, financial support, intelligence, and training to Ukraine, according to a US Department of Defense (DoD) fact sheet updated on 1 November. The most recent package for Ukraine was announced five days before the US election, and assistance packages could be put together any time during the nearly three-month period before Trump is inaugurated. It is unclear if the incoming president would continue to provide support.
Meanwhile, US officials have also provided aid to Israel and Gaza – weapons and humanitarian assistance respectively. With the conflict broadening to include combat in Lebanon, Trump's future national security team will have to determine how it will approach the duelling assistance requests from Kyiv and Tel Aviv.
About 31 Abrams main battle tanks have been delivered to Ukraine as part of US assistance. (US Army)
In addition, assistance to both wars has spurred a national security response in the defence manufacturing space. To accommodate Ukraine's continuous requests for ammunition, NATO and the US invested heavily in the metals and energetics manufacturing needed to ramp up production of 155 mm artillery rounds as well as rockets. While many of the facility upgrades needed for the ramp-up have been resourced, the next administration would have to determine how the additional manufacturing capacity would be utilised.
To provide aid to Ukraine and Israel, the Joe Biden administration has needed to pass multiple supplemental funding bills. The next administration's decision on assistance for foreign conflicts will impact how much space future defence budgets will have for US capabilities.
Industry plans
Prospects for the next US defence budget are unclear, especially because the US political parties could potentially split control over the legislature.
The Biden administration in March requested a total of USD849.8 billion for its discretionary defence budget in fiscal year (FY) 2025. This includes a USD33.9 billion, or 4.2%, increase over the FY 2023 base budget of USD815.9 billion.
The health of the US defence industrial base and supply chains will continue to be an issue for the next administration. In 2017 then President Trump issued Executive Order 13806 spurring the DoD to assess US manufacturing and defence industrial base and supply chain resiliency. The report, published in 2018, brought renewed attention to the issue, which has continued through the Biden administration.
US dependence on China for the supply and processing of critical minerals may be a focus for the second Trump administration. During his first term, he issued an executive order to develop secure critical minerals supply chains and expand US mining capabilities. This issue may receive greater focus in his next administration; during a September 2024 campaign stop, Trump pledged to eliminate environmental protections hindering the opening of new mines (although refining rare-earth materials in the US has notable cost issues, so ‘nearshoring' locations may need to be identified).
Similarly, the Biden administration passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022 to bolster the US semiconductor industry, which supplies vital components for a variety of commercial and military goods. Trump has derided the act, which has delivered billions of dollars to the micro-electronics industry. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson subsequently threatened to seek to repeal the act, remarks that he later walked back on, instead saying in a statement that there may be an effort to reduce regulations and environmental requirements.
Researchers with the DREAMS hub in California work on micro-electronics in a clean room. Boosting micro-electronics production has been a priority for the Biden administration. (DREAMS)
Trump has proposed widespread tariffs, which could be welcomed by parts of the defence industrial base. The forging industry, for example, has pointed to tariffs as necessary to protect it from China, which controls 46% of the global forging market, according to a Forging Industry Association (FIA) fact sheet.
The Republican Party platform, released in July 2024, emphasises the importance of the defence industrial base and pledges to continue to invest in it and onshore critical capabilities.
Aerospace policies
In 2019 the Trump administration established the US Space Force (USSF) as a new branch of the armed forces. Roles and personnel were primarily carved from the US Air Force, but other services participated as well.
The administration could accelerate the adoption of commercial space launches for national security. The armed forces and intelligence community could purchase space launches under the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) programme, which qualifies launch vehicles to perform such missions following technical evaluations of previous launches. The NSSL programme is a break from earlier policies that effectively restricted launches to the United Launch Alliance's (ULA's) Delta and Atlas series of rockets. The 2015 qualification of SpaceX's Falcon 9 broke the ULA's monopoly, joined in 2019 by Falcon Heavy.
NSSL is divided into two categories. Lane 1 is intended to incorporate any provider who can demonstrate an orbital launch capability, recently expanded to include providers who can likely demonstrate such a capability by December 2025. Lane 2 is reserved for qualified launch vehicles, intended to loft the largest and most critical capabilities into orbit.
The new administration can decide whether or not to open both Lanes to providers not yet qualified under current policies, accepting greater risk in exchange for faster qualifications and a boost for an industry that depends on government contracts to thrive. The clearest potential beneficiaries of such a shift are companies with as-yet-unproven products. The small launch space ecosystem teems with concepts that rarely survive to reach orbit, but increased opportunities for government contracts may stimulate their ability to raise funds, leading to greater competition within the sector.
Another issue the new Republican administration will have to address is the push for commercial satellite communications (satcom) capabilities for US military operations.
In April 2024 DoD issued guidance on how the Pentagon should continue to and possibly accelerate integration of commercial, space-based technologies into the department's national security space architecture. Increased collaboration with the commercial sector developing advanced technologies was a key tenet in the 2022 National Security Strategy, and the ongoing war in Ukraine has underscored the potential of civilian space-based capabilities as a combat enabler.
However, the Ukraine conflict has also sparked concern over how much of a hand commercial satcom companies will have in determining how their services will be used on the battlefield.
The Republican platform leaves the issue of commercial satcom on the battlefield largely unaddressed, except to mention the party's plans to “create a robust manufacturing industry in Near Earth Orbit … and enhance partnerships with the rapidly expanding commercial space sector”.
Meanwhile, various policies restrict defence exports, which the new administration could ease in a bid to increase overall US exports. One example is the Lockheed Martin F-35, which though widely exported to US allies, has seen several deals scuttled under restrictions that Trump has publicly decried. Türkiye was restricted from receiving F-35s due to its purchase of Russian-made surface-to-air missile systems, and although the Trump administration quashed the deal under legislative pressure, Trump referred to the measure as unfair. A similar situation resulted from the United Arab Emirates' (UAE's) intended F-35 purchase, which was formalised under Trump's presidency but cancelled by the Biden administration.
For more information, please see US presidential election: Myriad policy decisions loom for Trump's second term
