Date Posted: 06-Dec-2024
Author: F Xavier Casals, London, UK Sarbhanu Nath, Bangalore, India Saurav Sarkar, Bangalore, India
Key points
- This warning intelligence report uses 11 indicators to assess whether China will attempt to invade Taiwan in the next six to 12 months and to identify the most likely alternative futures to this scenario
- The CPC's stated objective of achieving unification with Taiwan and the Chinese PLA's ongoing modernisation and strengthening of capabilities across all domains continue to increase the threat of a major military conflict in the Taiwan Strait
- Janes assesses that in the most likely scenario (75% likelihood), China would continue to focus on intimidation and coercion tactics against Taiwan in the coming six to 12 months but refrain from launching a military operation
IQ scenario: China launches a large-scale invasion of Taiwan (5% likelihood)
Scenario description
In this scenario, China conducts a seaborne invasion of Taiwan, with accompanying aerial (aircraft and missile) attacks targeting key Taiwanese command-and-control, communication, and political nodes, before launching an amphibious assault on several beaches located on Taiwan's northern and western coast.
China would seek to achieve air superiority in the first phase before attempting to secure beachheads to land troops on Taiwan's main island. China would also use civilian vessels to augment its troop and equipment transport capabilities across the Taiwan Strait. The PLA Navy (PLAN) would take up blocking positions around the Taiwan Strait and encircle Taiwan to prevent external support from reaching the island as well as to prevent breakout attempts by Taiwanese forces. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) would also support the navy in blockading the island and preventing aerial reinforcement and resupply of Taiwan by external actors.
Likelihood justification
Janes assesses that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is very unlikely to happen in the next six to 12 months (5% likelihood). There has been no significant hostile rhetoric from the Chinese leadership towards Taiwan calling for war or armed action against Taiwan in the past 12 months. China has also not issued mobilisation orders for its troops that would be indicative of imminent military action against Taiwan. There have not been any extra recruitment campaigns by the PLA to bolster its ranks, and recruitment drives at the provincial and local levels have proceeded according to the annual schedule in 2024.
Janes conducted satellite imagery analysis of multiple military bases and facilities in Eastern Theater Command (ETC). Out of the 63 facilities reviewed, significant expansion activities were observed at eight facilities between October 2023 and October 2024. However, the expansion activities by themselves are not indicative of China preparing for an invasion within the coming six to 12 months. A related indicator of China massing troops in the ETC and an expansion of the bases to accommodate troops is also absent. A massing of troops and assets in the ETC along with expanded bases would be a positive indicator for an invasion scenario.
Separately, China has not conducted an intensive number of amphibious, combined arms, or joint exercises between October 2023 and 2024 that would indicate preparations for an invasion. For instance, Janes observed four amphibious drills conducted by units of the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) during the observation period. All the observed exercises involved brigade-sized units and were less intensive in scale than similar exercises conducted in the previous 12 months. While there were no combined civilian-military drills observed in October 2023–24, Janes noted at least three instances of China's military using civilian assets in drills. Integrating civilian assets into military operations would very likely be necessary to augment China's capabilities in the event of a high-tempo invasion scenario. However, preparation for an invasion would almost certainly be indicated by China conducting large-scale and frequent drills involving the use of civilian assets. The three drills observed by Janes do not fit these parameters and very likely indicate China testing the use of civilian assets to support military operations rather than integrating those assets for a military operation.
In addition, there have been no indicators to show that Taiwan is preparing for an invasion by China within the next six to 12 months. Taiwan has not conducted civil defence or air raid drills beyond annually scheduled drills. Taiwan has also not released new or updated war guidelines for its civilians after issuing a civil defence contingency handbook in June 2023, indicating that the government does not consider an invasion imminent.
Scenario key assumptions
- China will prioritise a military capability build-up before launching an invasion of Taiwan.
- The military activities carried out by China are part of its regular force improvement posture.
- Taiwanese intelligence will have sufficient warning of an impending Chinese invasion, which will influence the government's decision to prepare its citizens for war.
For more information, please see Warning intelligence report: China likely to continue to prioritise intimidation and coercion over military action against Taiwan in the next six to 12 months
